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Supreme Court, U.S.
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No. _____

IN THE

SUPREME COURT of the UNITED STATES

October Term, 1991

SAMUEL I. PRATHER,

Petitioner,

vs.

THE DAYTON POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

To the United States Court of Appeals
For the Sixth Circuit

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I.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

DOES PATTERSON V. McCLEAN CREDIT UNION APPLY TO ALL DISCRIMINATORY DISCHARGE CASES?

SHOULD PATTERSON v. McCLEAN CREDIT UNION HAVE BEEN APPLIED RETROACTIVELY WHERE SUMMARY JUDGMENT HAD ALREADY BEEN GRANTED IN PETITIONER'S FAVOR ON THE ISSUE OF LIABILITY AND WHERE THE ONLY ISSUES LEFT TO BE RESOLVED WERE THE TYPES AND AMOUNTS OF DAMAGES DUE HIM?

WHERE THE FACTS ALLEGED IN PETITIONER'S TENDERED SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT AROSE FROM THE SAME CONDUCT AND OCCURRENCES ALLEGED IN PETITIONER'S ORIGINAL AND FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINTS, AND WHERE THE OPPOSING PARTY IS AWARE OF THESE FACTS AND WOULD NOT BE UNDULY PREJUDICED BY THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, SHOULD PRATHER HAVE BEEN PERMITTED TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT TO CONFORM TO THE NEW STANDARDS SUBSEQUENTLY SET FORTH IN PATTERSON v. McCLEAN CREDIT UNION?

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The citation to the most recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is Prather v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 918 F.2d 1255 (1990), set forth in the Appendix at p. A1. The decisions of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio are unreported and are set forth in the Appendix at pp. A16 and A31, respectively..

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Petitioner, Samuel I. Prather, prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit entered on November 14, 1990, which affirmed the decision of the United

States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. Petitioner's Motion for Rehearing was denied by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on December 28, 1990.

Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES INVOLVED

42 U.S.C. Section 1981. See Appendix at p. A43.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On March 18, 1985, Prather filed his original Complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio pursuant to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. 1981, seeking injunctive relief (reinstatement) and compensatory and exemplary damages against DP&L. Based on a previous state court judgment and the doctrine of res judicata, Prather moved for summary judgment in the District Court on the issue of DP&L's liability under Section 1981.

Following an intermediate appeal to the Sixth Circuit on a statute of limitations issue, the case was remanded to the District Court. Upon remand the magistrate recommended that Prather's Summary Judgment Motion as to DP&L's liability be granted, based on the

doctrine of res judicata. Thereafter, both parties consented to Magistrate trial jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 636(c), and on March 17, 1989, the Magistrate adopted his prior Report and Recommendations as a decision, with certain modifications. Immediately prior to that Order, Prather filed an Amended Complaint specifying his damages claims and the parties prepared a proposed joint final pretrial order which was journalized with slight modifications after a final pretrial conference held on August 4, 1989.

At the final pretrial conference, (four days before trial) DP&L sought leave to file a Motion for Summary Judgment. Leave was granted and DP&L filed the motion, sub judice, on August 9, 1989, based on this Court's decision in Patterson v. McClean Credit Union,

491 U.S. ____, 105 L.Ed. 2d 132, 109 S.Ct. 2363 (decided June 15, 1989). Prather filed his Memorandum in Opposition on August 10th. On the morning of trial, August 14, 1989, the Magistrate granted DP&L's Motion for Summary Judgment, thereby dismissing Prather's amended complaint (without prejudice) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and dismissing with prejudice, Prather's claim for racially motivated discharge.

In its Journal Entry dated August 14, 1989, the Magistrate permitted Prather to file a written Motion for Leave to Amend its Complaint to conform to the new standards set forth in Patterson. Prather filed the motion and tendered his Second Amended Complaint therewith. Simultaneously, Prather filed a Motion to Alter, Amend or Vacate

the Decision and Entry of the Magistrate granting DP&L's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Magistrate denied Prather's Motion to Amend the Judgment on September 7, 1989.

On September 25, 1989, Prather filed a Supplement to his Motion to Amend his Complaint; this Supplement contained specific references to DP&L's retaliatory conduct during the arbitration and grievance procedures. With time running, and no decision having been made on its Motion to Amend his Complaint, Prather filed for a 30 day extension of time (to 11/6/89) to file his Notice of Appeal from the Magistrate's Decision and Entry of August 14, 1989; said extension was duly granted.

In its Decision and Order dated October 30, 1989, the Magistrate denied Prather's Motion to Amend his Complaint.

Prather appealed the Magistrate's Decision and Entry granting DP&L's Motion for Summary Judgment and denying his Motion to Amend his Complaint to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. It is from the Sixth Circuit's affirmation of the District Court's Judgment that this Petition for Certiorari arises.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Petitioner, Samuel I. Prather, a black male, started working for the Dayton Power and Light Company on March 19, 1970, at the Stuart Generating Station. Through a series of promotions, Prather attained the highest

status in his rank, First Class Technician A. During his 12 1/2 years of service with the Company, Prather's only discipline was a one day suspension.

Prather worked with a crew of seven other technicians, all of whom were white; his immediate supervisor, Mike Mason, was white; and another white foreman, Bob Hackathorn, also had supervisory authority over Prather. The manager of Prather's unit, David Elkins, was white, as was the manager of the Stuart Station, Bob Ralston.

On Sunday, September 12, 1982, Prather was working with a helper and had three job assignments. When they reported to the shop to obtain materials for their second job, they heard general laughter, and were informed that some other employees had punched holes in a

water hose so that when two men, Danny Doyle and Bob Hackathorn, used the hose, they were sprayed with water. While this hose was being repaired, foremen Mason and Hackathorn left the area, and some of the employees resumed trying to punch more holes in another piece of hose. In the midst of this activity, someone passed Prather a knife and encouraged him to cut another hole in the hose, which he did.

This kind of "horseplay" was an everyday occurrence at the Stuart Station, and never resulted in punishment or discipline of any kind. For example, both supervisors and other employees routinely engaged in various acts, some physically harmful, including dumping buckets of water on each other, busting hard hats, and wrestling and grabbing other individuals' testicles.

Foremen Mike Mason and Bob Hackathorn were involved in many such incidents. Even Station Manager Ralston admitted discharging a handgun at the worksite, and later testified that he "couldn't recall" whether Company property was damaged in the process. Many of these acts of horseplay also damaged Company property, including incidents where employees would find their lockers glued or welded shut. One such employee, John Fuert, reported such an incident to management, but there was never any disciplinary action taken.

In each of the above mentioned cases the participants were white, and none of them were ever disciplined for those actions. In fact, although foremen Mason and Hackathorn themselves were aware of, and participated in many of these incidents, they had <u>never</u>

written up any employee for either horseplay or destruction of Company property.

On the day in question (September 12, 1982), however, Hackathorn thought he saw Prather cutting the hose and told Mason about it. The two white foreman wrote memoranda about the incident to Unit Manager Elkins, who in turn reported it to Station Manager Ralston. Ralston instructed Elkins to investigate the matter. Pursuant to this alleged "investigation", Elkins submitted a recommendation to Ralston that Prather be discharged, based on several "conclusions". Elkins stated that the "root cause" of Prather's actions was a "basic character flaw"; that Prather does not see the right or wrong of damaging Company property, be it in the act of horseplay or otherwise; and that

the only "effective corrective action" which would remedy Prather's "basic character flaw" would have to be termination, as any lesser discipline would not remedy that "non-trainable flaw". Based on this recommendation, Prather was placed on "indefinite suspension" on September 13, 1989. Shortly thereafter, (9/20/89), Prather was notified of his discharge by a letter signed only by Elkins.

The record establishes that Mason, Hackathorn, and Elkins are admitted racists and/or have exhibited racist behavior. For example, earlier in 1982, Mason told Prather that "if anybody ever got to walk your (Prather's) fat black ass to the gate, he (Mason) hoped he was the one to do it!", this statement was attested to by both Prather and witness, Eddie Grooms. Mason continually made

racial slurs and degrading remarks about Prather in the presence of witness Frank Rosselot. Rosselot testified that he had frequently heard Mason call Prather "a lazy black bastard" and a "nigger". Mason also made no secret of his racism to witness John Feurt, who returned from a work related back injury on September 14, 1982, while Prather was still on an indefinite suspension pending the alleged "investigation" of the matter. At that time, Mason informed Feurt that "we're finally rid of that lazy fuckin' nigger!"

With regard to the other employee who "reported" Prather's actions; Bob Hackathorn admitted that he was "prejudiced", but "working on it."

Throughout the course of his employment, Prather was a member of the recognized labor bargaining unit known

as "Local 175, Utility Workers, AFL-CIO". Immediately following his being placed on "indefinite suspension", Prather called for the intervention of Union Steward, Jim Work, who represented Prather throughout the labor contract arbitration procedure. Work indicated that he attempted to defend Prather during the contract grievance procedure, but that fear of retaliation by the Company (DP&L) kept potential witnesses silent.

Another DP&L employee, Randy Moore, indicated that fellow employees were afraid to come forward to help Prather because they feared retaliation by the Company, especially after seeing what happened to Danny Doyle when he tried to help Prather. Another employee, Danny Dudley, indicated that it was clear to him that the Company had no intention of

allowing a fair investigation or a free airing of the issues during the Company investigation of the incident. Dudley further indicated that all of the hourly employees felt indirect pressure concerning the Prather incident which made it impossible for them to assist Prather.

One DP&L employee who attempted to assist Prather during the arbitration procedure was subjected to more direct pressure. In his affidavit, Danny Doyle stated:

> Some time during the investigation by the Ohio Civil Rights Commission (OCRC) he agreed to give an affidavit concerning his personal involvement in horseplay and in the fact that he cut a hose only on a representation by the investigator for the OCRC that the affidavit would be kept in strictest confidence because he feared retaliation. Just prior to his testimony before the OCRC he was

> approached by a fellow employee who told him that Bob Ralston was very displeased by his cooperation with the OCRC and that he would keep his job if he would recant the affidavit and tell the OCRC that the affidavit was given under stress. That when he refused to recant the affidavit, he was left on indefinite suspension by DP&L. That he was later restored to his job at DP&L because of pressure from the OCRC.

Arbitration, a nonjudicial method of adjudicating disputes, was Prather's last avenue of relief prior to his termination. In summary, the arbitration panel concluded that the testimony adduced during the hearing did not show that racial bias entered into the cause for or the decision to discharge Prather.

BASIS FOR FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

The jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio was invoked pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 1343(a) and 42 U.S.C. 1981.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Petitioner, Samuel I. Prather, submits that the Judgment entered in this case by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is in conflict with the decision entered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on the issue of whether discriminatory discharges continue to be actionable under 42 U.S.C. Section 1981, in light of this Court's decision in Patterson v.

Mcclean Credit Union, and thus, there is a need for a uniform rule of law on this point.

I.

On August 14, 1989, the District Court dismissed Petitioner's (plaintiff/appellant below) cause of action for racially motivated discharge citing, Patterson v. Mcclean Credit Union, 491 U.S. ____, 105 L.Ed. 2d 132, 109 S.Ct. 2363 (1989). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the District Court citing Patterson for the proposition that all discriminatory discharge cases are no longer actionable under 42 U.S.C. 1981.

Petitioner submits that the Sixth Circuit's decision bars Petitioner's complete relief and leads to a tenuous view that the length of time between a

claimant's hiring and his discharge is the deciding factor in whether a discriminatory discharge action brought under Section 1981 can withstand Patterson.

In affirming the grant of Respondent's (appellee below) motion for summary judgment, the Sixth Circuit has taken upon itself to do what this Court itself has refused to do.

In Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, ____ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 2709, 105 L.Ed. 2d 598 (1989), decided one week after Patterson, this Court left unresolved the issue of whether discriminatory discharges continue to be actionable under Section 1981. More recently, this Court again reaffirmed that Patterson did not resolve the issue of whether discriminatory discharges are actionable

under Section 1981. See, Lylte v. Household Manufacturing, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 1331, 108 L.Ed. 2d 504 (1990).

In his dissenting opinion, Judge Boggs of the Sixth Circuit wrote, "I believe that a logical and faithful reading of the Supreme Court law compels the conclusion that discriminatory discharges are actionable under 42 U.S.C. 1981." In support of his position Judge Boggs reasoned:

> The entire reason for protecting "the right to make contracts" is because of the benefits of the status of having a contract or job. If 1981 can cover the failure to achieve a "new and distinct relation" [promotion] within an existing job, it would seem to me to be most illogical to deny that 1981 covers a persons being cast into a "new and distinct relation" -- that of unemployment -- from an existing job. Certainly that severance is far more drastic

> in practical terms than the failure to achieve a promotion. It is also more destructive of the existing relationship, the very relationship that is a reason given for not allowing actions based on conditions of employment.

Prather v. Dayton Power & Light Company, 918 F. 2d 1255, 1261, (6th Cir. 1990) (Boggs, J., dissenting).

Judge Boggs' views are in line with the opinion handed down by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Hicks v. Brown Group, Inc., 902 F. 2d 630 (8th Cir. 1990). In Hicks, the Eighth Circuit held, "Based on our examination of the nature of discharge and our interpretation of Section 1981, as well as the legislative history of Section 1981, we conclude that a claim for discriminatory discharge continues to be cognizable under Section 1981."

Circuit Judge McMillian, writing for the majority of the Eighth Circuit explained the court's position as follows:

> Because protection from racially motivated deprivations of contracts is essential to the full enjoyment of the right to make contracts, we hold that discriminatory discharge continues to be actionable under Section 1981. Discharge is fundamentally different from racial harassment or discrimination in the terms or conditions of employment. A employee who is harassed or subject to discriminatory terms or conditions of employment still receives the fundamental benefit of his or her employment contract - the employment itself - even though that employment may be unpleasant, degrading or obnoxious. In distinction, discriminatory discharge goes to the very existence and nature of the employment contract. A discriminatory discharge completely deprives the employee of his or her employment, the very essence of the right to make employment contracts...

> Accordingly we hold that discriminatory discharge directly affects the right to make contracts, and therefore is cognizable under Section 1981.

Hicks v. Brown Group, Inc., 902 F. 2d 630, 638-9 (8th Cir. 1990).

In a thorough analysis of the legislative history behind the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and particularly Section 1981, the Eighth Circuit further supported its decision by concluding that, "The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (1866 Act) supports [the] conclusion that Section 1981 prohibits discharges based on race." Hicks v. Brown Group, Inc., 902 F. 2d 630, 642 (8th Cir. 1990).

By concluding, that Patterson "logically extends to racially motivated discharges", the District Court and the Sixth Circuit have extended the scope of

Patterson beyond that enunciated by the Court.

Petitioner requests this Court to adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis and reaffirm the landmark case of Runyon v.McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), wherein it was firmly established that discriminatory discharge cases are actionable under 42 U.S.C. Section 1981.

II.

Petitioner further argues that Patterson should not have been applied retroactively where summary judgment had already been granted in his favor on the issue of liability and where the only issues left to be decided were the types and amount of damages due him.

First, Petitioner acknowledges that, "as a general rule, judicial decisions apply retroactively." Robinson

v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 507, 93 S.Ct. 876, 35 L.Ed.2d 29 (1973). However, this Court has recognized exceptions to the general rule. In Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 30 L.Ed. 2d 296, 306, 92 S.Ct. 349 (1971), this Court set forth three factors which should be considered before a case arising from the Supreme Court is applied retroactively. In that case this court stated:

> In our cases dealing with the nonretroactivity question, we have generally considered three separate factors. First, the decision to be applied nonretroactivley must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied,(citation omitted) or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed (citation omitted). Second, it has been stressed that we must weigh the merits and demerits in each case by

> looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation (citation omitted). Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for where a decision of this court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the injustice of hardship by a holding of nonretroactivity (citation omitted).

Id. at 30 L.Ed. 2d 296, 306.

Addressing the first factor discussed above, Petitioner argues that Patterson undeniably overrules clear past precedent. From the time that this action was initiated through its Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of Respondent's liability, Petitioner correctly relied on existing law to support its position that, "the elements of a claim for relief from racial

discrimination under 42 U.S.C. 1981 are identical to those under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq." See, Prather v. Dayton Power & Light Co., No.C-3-85-491 (S.D. OH 1988) Because of Patterson, this proposition is no longer a correct statement of the law.

The second factor is whether a retroactive application of the new rule (here, Patterson), will "further or retard its operation." Nonretroactive application of Patterson to the case at bar would not retard the purpose underlying Patterson (ie..to limit the application of section 1981 to the making and enforcement of contractual relations). This is because Petitioner's discharge claim is inextricably intertwined with his "right to enforce established contract obligations" (through grievance

procedures, including arbitration; both, nonjudicial methods of adjudicating disputes), thus falling within the enumerated rights set forth in Section 1981, and, consistent with the decision reached in Patterson. Furthermore, other parties bringing Section 1981 claims accruing after Patterson will be able to plead and litigate their claims according to the Patterson limitations, unlike the Petitioner herein, whose cause of action and subsequent judgment in his favor, existed prior to the Patterson decision.

The inequities of this latter consideration evolves into the third factor considered by the Chevron Court, that is, the substantial inequitable results that may be brought to bear upon a plaintiff whose cause of action accrued prior to a change in the law.

Retroactive application of Patterson to the instant case effectively deprives Petitioner of any chance of recovery under Section 1981 in an action where the Respondent's "appalling" conduct and liability for racial discrimination had already been firmly established.

Second, case law supports the contention that Patterson should not be applied retroactively. See, Gillespie v. First Interstate Bank, 50 FEP Cases 587, 588, n.2 (D.C. E. Wis., decided July 14, 1989). In that case, Bridget Gillespie brought an action against her employer, First Interstate Bank of Wisconsin, alleging racial discrimination in employment and retaliatory discharge in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. Gillespie filed her action on September 6, 1985. Plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(EEOC), filed an action on September 25, 1985, against First Interstate alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The two cases were consolidated on January 8, 1986. In denying the defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Patterson, the court stated:

> In light of the standards governing retroactivity, (citation omitted) I conclude that Patterson should not be applied retroactively.
>
> It is clear that racial discrimination in the context of discharge or other conditions of employment was recognized as actionable under section 1981 by the Seventh Circuit prior to Patterson. (citations omitted). In addition, nonretroactive application will not hamper the interests in establishing uniformity and reducing litigation as this case is today resolved for all practical purposes in this

> court. Finally, this case was already tried and awaiting a decision on post verdict motions when Patterson was decided. The parties have expended substantial time and money in prosecuting or defending this suit. I find that retroactive application of Patterson would be entirely unfair and inequitable under the circumstances.

Id. at 50 FEP Cases 588, n.2 (emphasis added).

As in Gillespie, Petitioner herein argues that racial discrimination in the context of discharge or other conditions of employment was recognized as actionable under Section 1981 prior to the Patterson decision.

In the instant case, like the case before the Gillespie court, the issue of Respondent's liability under Section 1981 has been resolved for all practical purposes since the District Court granted Petitioner's Motion for Summary

Judgment on the issue of Respondent's liability on April 18, 1988. Therefore, Patterson should not have been applied retroactively where as here, there remained only issues involving the types and amount of damages due Petitioner under section 1981.

III.

Rule 15(a), of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that leave to amend a pleading "shall be freely given when justice so requires" and this Court has stated that this mandate is to be heeded:

> If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits. In the absence of any apparent or declared reason-such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of

> the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of the allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment etc.-the leave sought should, as the rules require, be "freely given."
>
> Of course, the grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the trial court, but outright refusal to grant the leave without any justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an exercise of discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion and inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal Rules. (emphasis added).

Foreman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 9 L.Ed. 2d 222, 83 S.Ct. 227 (1962).

While the Foreman, decision set forth a variety of factors that the court may consider in determining whether to grant leave to amend, the crucial factor is the resulting prejudice to the opposing party. United States v. Hougham, 364 U.S. 310, 5 L.Ed.

2d 8, 81 S.Ct. 13 (1960), Hageman v. Signal L.P. Gas Co., 486 F.2d 479 (6th Cir. 1973).

While usually referred to simply as prejudice, the prejudice to the opposing party must be undue or substantial prejudice. See, Hageman v. Signal L.P. Gas Co., 486 F.2d 479 (6th Cir. 1973). The burden is upon the opposing party to assert and demonstrate that it will be substantially prejudiced by the proposed amendments. Hageman, supra, at 484.

Generally, an opposing party will not be prejudiced by an amended pleading if the amendment relates to the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence alleged in the original pleading, or if the opposing party is aware of the facts contained in the amended pleading. 27 Fed. Proc. L.Ed. 381, 397, citing, inter alia, Hageman, supra, (emphasis added).

In affirming the District Court's Decision denying Petitioner's Motion to Amend its Complaint, the Sixth Circuit concluded that, "To force appellee (DP&L) to begin to formulate a defense to these allegations at this late date would be highly prejudicial." In reaching its decision the Sixth Circuit construed the word "discharge" to have a limited, technical meaning.

Petitioner submits that a claim of discriminatory discharge covers the <u>whole process</u> from initial layoff through the grievance procedure to a final determination of employment status.

In the present case, the claims that were the subject of Petitioner's tendered Second Amended Complaint arose out of the same conduct and occurrences which formed the basis of Petitioner's

original and first amended complaint. In support of this position, Petitioner argues that the discharge process began when Petitioner was first accused of cutting the hose; the decision was then made to suspend Petitioner indefinitely pending further investigation. Petitioner immediately called for the intervention of Union Steward Jim Work, who represented Petitioner throughout the arbitration proceedings. The ultimate conclusion of the arbitration panel (which sustained the decision of the Company) was tainted by false testimony and intimidation of witnesses. All steps of the grievance procedure are inherent in the discharge process which was illegally tainted under the proscriptions of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981.

This Court has previously ruled that the factor of time alone is not

sufficient to constitute prejudice and prevent an amendment to a complaint. Johnson vs. Atlantic G. & W.I. Transit Co., 156 U.S. 619 (1895). Cleveland Newspaper Guild v. Plain Dealer, 839 F.2d 1147 (6th. Cir. 1988).

Other than the lapse of time itself, there is nothing in the record to show how the Respondent would have been prejudiced by the amendment. All of the witnesses are still in Respondent's employ and available for deposition at any time. The clear fact is that time has not eroded Respondent's ability to defend the case.

Additionally, Petitioner argues that while the facts regarding the Respondent's interference with Petitioner's established contract rights may not have been in issue during the course of this litigation, they are by

no means new facts unknown to Respondent.

At the time that Petitioner filed this action, the limitations imposed by Patterson did not exist. Petitioner should not be charged with the duty of foreseeing pending changes in the law and should certainly not be deprived of his cause of action where he has pleaded and litigated his case properly from its inception.

CONCLUSION

From all of the issues discussed above, only one conclusion can emerge. That conclusion is, because retroactive application of Patterson is not proper where Respondent's liability had already been firmly established; because this Court to date, has not seen it appropriate to include "discharge" cases

under the pall of Patterson, and because of the dissimilarity of "discharge" cases themselves, this action should be remanded to its original position before the District Court and a new date should be set for the trial on the issue of damages.

Should this court agree with the Sixth Circuit's opinion as it relates to the retroactive application of Patterson, Petitioner argues that the claims set forth in Petitioner's tendered Second Amended complaint refer to the same conduct or occurrences which formed the basis of Petitioner's original and first amended complaints; and that all of the facts supporting Petitioner's current amendments were well known by Respondent .and thus are unlikely to "unduly" or "substantially" prejudice Respondent. Therefore, this

case should be remanded to the District Court with an order granting Petitioner's Motion to Amend and the amendments contained therein should relate back to the filing date of Petitioner's original complaint.

Petitioner respectfully prays that a Writ of Certiorari be granted.



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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Edward S. Monohan, a member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States and Counsel of Record for Petitioner, Samuel I. Prather, hereby certify that three copies of the foregoing Petition were mailed, by United States 1st class mail, postage prepaid, on this 26th day of March, 1991, to Neil F. Freund, 1800 Arcade Center, 1 S. Main Street, Dayton, OH 45402-2017, Attorney for Respondent, Dayton Power & Light Company.

Edward S. Monohan

EDWARD S. MONOHAN
Counsel of Record

APPENDICES

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 24

No. 89-3999

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

SAMUEL I. PRATHER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DAYTON POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.

ON APPEAL from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio

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Decided and Filed November 14, 1990

Before: KENNEDY, BOGGS, and TIMBERS*, Circuit Judges.

KENNEDY, Circuit Judge, delivered the opinion of the Court, in which TIMBERS, Circuit Judge, joined. BOGGS, Circuit Judge (pp. 9-16), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

KENNEDY, Circuit Judge. Appellant Samuel I. Prather appeals the grant of summary judgment to his employer, Dayton Power & Light Company, in this 42

*The Honorable William H. Timbers, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting by designation.

U.S.C. § 1981 action in which he claims he was discharged on account of his race. Relying on *Patterson v. McLean Credit Union*, 491 U.S. ___, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989), the magistrate held that section 1981 provided no remedy for racially motivated discharges. Prather also appeals the denial of his motion to amend his complaint. For the reasons stated hereafter we affirm.

In September 1982, appellant was terminated by Dayton. He pursued a grievance process through collective bargaining arbitration, alleging that he was discharged because of his race, and filed a complaint with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission. The arbitration panel denied his grievance but he eventually received back pay and reinstatement through the Ohio Civil Rights Commission proceedings.

In March 1985, appellant filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, seeking additional damages for his discriminatory discharge. Following an appeal to this Court, which held that the statute of limitations did not bar appellant's claim, appellant's motion for summary judgment on liability was granted, based on the *res judicata* effect of the state court decision. Before the trial on damages began, the Supreme Court decided *Patterson*. In light of *Patterson*, appellee moved for summary judgment, which the magistrate granted.[1] Appellant then moved to amend his complaint in an attempt to allege facts that would maintain a 1981 action after *Patterson*. Appellant's motion was denied.

I. Application of *Patterson*

The Supreme Court held in *Patterson* that an employee's claims of racial harassment by the employer were not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 "because that provision does not apply to conduct which occurs after the formation of a contract and which does not interfere with

[1]The parties had consented to magistrate trial jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

the right to enforce established contract obligations." 109 S. Ct. at 2369. Section 1981 provides:

> All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other

The *Patterson* Court held that section 1981 does not cover conditions of employment, but only discrimination in the formation of the employment contract or the right to enforce that contract.

> The most obvious feature of the provision is the restriction of its scope to forbidding discrimination in the "mak[ing] and enforce[ment]" of contracts alone. Where an alleged act of discrimination does not involve the impairment of one of these specific rights, § 1981 provides no relief.

Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2372 (quoting section 1981).

The Court held that unless the alleged discrimination affected the plaintiff's right to enter into a contract or her right to enforce a contract through judicial or nonjudicial means, then it, "reprehensible though it be if true, is not actionable under § 1981, which covers only conduct at the initial formation of the contract and conduct which impairs the right to enforce contract obligations through legal process." *Id.* at 2374. *Patterson* did not address the issue of discharge directly, but it did explicitly limit the application of section 1981 to discrimination in the formation or enforcement of contracts. Discharge from employment involves neither of these elements.

This Circuit has applied *Patterson* to discharge cases in earlier unpublished opinions.[2] This appears to be the first case, however, in which the application of *Patterson* to discharge cases is addressed directly in a decision for publication. To limit *Patterson* to cases involving discrimination in ongoing employment is to ignore the language and reasoning of the Supreme Court. *Patterson* explicitly stated that section 1981 "does not apply to conduct which occurs after the formation of a contract and which does not interfere with the right to enforce established contract obligations." *Id.* at 2369. In refusing to extend section 1981 to harassment cases, the Court reasoned that Title VII's procedures would be of little effect if they could be circumvented by suits under section 1981. Title VII is clearly concerned with discharge cases and provides for back pay and reinstatement.[3] Reinstatement is not available under section 1981 and is much more likely to come about in the conciliation procedures of Title VII. The Court noted:

> Unnecessary overlap between Title VII and § 1981 would also serve to upset the delicate balance between employee and employer rights struck by Title VII in other respects. For instance, a plaintiff in a Title VII action is limited to a recovery of backpay, whereas under § 1981 a plaintiff may be entitled to plenary compensatory damages, as well as punitive damages in an appropriate case. Both the employee and employer will be unlikely to agree to a conciliatory resolution of the dispute under Title VII if the employer can be found liable for much greater amounts under § 1981.

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[2] *See Jones v. City of Cleveland*, No. 89-3444 (6th Cir. Mar. 15, 1990) (unpublished per curiam); *Singleton v. Kellogg Co.*, No. 89-1073 (6th Cir. Nov. 29, 1989) (unpublished per curiam) ("In light of *Patterson*, plaintiff's claim of racially discriminatory discharge is no longer cognizable under section 1981").

[3] Over 43% of all Title VII cases involve discharge, a far greater percentage than that attributed to any other issue. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, CENTRAL DATABASE STATISTICS (1989) (available upon request from EEOC).

Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2375 n.4.

Other circuits which have decided this issue have not agreed on whether *Patterson* excludes discharge cases from causes of action created by section 1981. Several circuits have held that *Patterson* does apply to discharge cases. *See McKnight v. General Motors Corp.*, 908 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1990); *Courtney v. Canyon Television & Appliance Rental, Inc.*, 899 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1990); *Lavender v. V & B Transmissions & Auto Repair*, 897 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1990). *Contra Hicks v. Brown Group, Inc.*, 902 F.2d 630 (8th Cir. 1990) (*Patterson* does not apply to discharge cases).

Appellant argues that *Patterson* does not apply to discriminatory discharge because if discrimination is allowed in the termination of a contract, the purpose of forbidding discrimination in the formation of that contract is defeated. The Eighth Circuit, in its decision in *Hicks*, was concerned with the situation in which section 1981 would prevent discrimination in hiring an applicant one day but would not prevent the employer from discharging that same applicant the next. Section 1981, however, cannot be read as an isolated piece of legislation. Although section 1981 does not create a cause of action for discriminatory discharge, it does not forbid such suits. A plaintiff who has no recourse under section 1981 may still pursue a course of litigation under Title VII, as well as under many state civil rights statutes. Excluding discharge cases from section 1981 actions does not leave plaintiffs without recourse. Appellant's case serves as an example, showing that the different remedies fit together. He has already sued and recovered back pay and reinstatement in a prior state action. It is not necessary to apply section 1981 to discharge cases, and "the Court in *Patterson* counseled against stretching the meaning of section 1981 to protect conduct already covered by Title VII." *Overby v. Chevron USA, Inc.*, 884 F.2d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1989).

The dissent fails to recognize that Title VII procedures are designed, in discharge cases, to reinstate the employee and resurrect the ongoing relationship. It was Ohio's substitute for Title VII that reinstated Prather. The ongoing relationship with which the *Patterson* Court is concerned, therefore, does exist where the discharged plaintiff prevails, either through EEOC conciliation (or its state substitute) or a Title VII action, and that relationship is likely to be harmed by the award of section 1981 damages.

Further, the case before us does not involve a situation where an employer hired an applicant to conform with section 1981, but never intended to actually make a contract on the terms offered to others. Appellant had been employed for several years before his discharge. The discriminatory conduct he experienced took place well after his contract of employment was in place.

We turn next to the issue of retroactivity. The general rule that judicial decisions be given retroactive effect applies here. *See Robinson v. Neil*, 409 U.S. 505 (1973). In *Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson*, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), the Supreme Court established three factors that call for the application of the non-retroactivity exception. The situation in this case does not satisfy those factors. Although *Patterson* may have established new law, applying it retroactively will not "'retard its operation,'" nor will it produce "'substantial inequitable results'" that might otherwise be avoided. *Id.* at 106-07 (citations omitted). Although retroactive application of *Patterson* will prevent appellant from obtaining damages under section 1981, appellant has already received reinstatement and back pay through use of state proceedings. Appellant will not, therefore, be unduly prejudiced.[4]

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[4]This Court has already applied *Patterson* retroactively in several unpublished decisions. *See* cases cited *supra* note 2; *Bell v. Kroger, Inc.*, No. 89-3206 (6th Cir. Mar. 6, 1990) (unpublished per curiam) (transfer claim); *Becton v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co.*, No. 86-

II. Appellant's Motion to Amend his Complaint

Appellant moves to amend his complaint in an attempt to continue his section 1981 action. Appellant wishes to incorporate claims that in 1983 appellee interfered with the arbitration proceedings on this matter. Appellant claims that appellee threatened and intimidated witnesses to prevent them from testifying at the arbitration proceedings. Appellant now claims that those actions constituted a violation of his right to enforce his contract. Appellant's amended complaint would claim that appellee violated section 1981 with its "efforts to impede access to the courts or obstruct nonjudicial methods of adjudicating disputes about the force of binding obligations . . . ." *Patterson*, 109 S. Ct. at 2373.

The magistrate denied appellant's motion to amend his complaint because the amendment at this late date, eight years after he was discharged and seven years after the alleged intimidation, would be highly prejudicial to the appellee. Appellant's original and amended complaint included only allegations of discriminatory discharge. Appellant offers no reason for the omission of these claims from his earlier complaint. The amendment relates to entirely different conduct than that involved in the original complaint, since the arbitration process was never before at issue. To force appellee to begin to formulate a defense to these allegations at this late date would be highly prejudicial. *See Foman v. Davis*, 371 U.S. 178 (1962). The magistrate did not abuse his discretion in denying appellant's motion to amend the complaint.

The grant of appellee's motion for summary judgment and denial of appellant's motion to amend are AFFIRMED.

6136 (6th Cir. July 10, 1989) (unpublished per curiam) (claims of harassment and demotion).

BOGGS, Circuit Judge, dissenting. Because I believe that a logical and faithful reading of the Supreme Court case law compels the conclusion that discriminatory discharges are actionable under 42 U.S.C. §1981, I respectfully dissent.

I believe that the statutory language, "right . . . to make . . . contracts," is properly interpreted to include the right to continue to work under an employment contract in the face of a discriminatory discharge. This interpretation has been confirmed by the Supreme Court on numerous occasions. *See, e.g., Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.*, 482 U.S. 656 (1987); *Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji*, 481 U.S. 604 (1987); *McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.*, 427 U.S. 273 (1976). It has never been explicitly rejected.

A commonsense understanding of §1981 is that the right to be free from discrimination in the making of a contract includes the right to be free from discrimination in the unilateral termination of that contract. Discharge is fundamentally different from harassment and other types of "conduct by the employer after the contract relation has been established." *Patterson*, 109 S. Ct. at 2373. By subsuming discriminatory discharge under the category of "conduct which occurs after the formation of a contract," *id.* at 2369, the court today dismisses what seems to me to be a basic distinction: by no other postformation action is the employee deprived of the fundamental benefit of the employment contract -- a job. A discriminatory discharge destroys the very existence of the contract and deprives the employee of the essence of the right to make an employment contract.

It seems to me rather irrelevant that, as the court notes, Prather was not terminated the very day or week after he entered his employment contract. That "[t]he discriminatory conduct that he experienced took place well after his contract of employment was in place" (opinion at 6) does not diminish the harshness of the court's general holding. By relieving an employer of

liability under §1981 for firing an employee after hiring, the court permits an employer to accomplish through the back door what §1981 will not permit that employer to do directly. I find it thoroughly inconsistent to require an employer to be nondiscriminatory in hiring but to allow that employer to fire with impunity under the statute.

The Supreme Court decisions interpreting 42 U.S.C. §1981 and its reach are not a model of clarity. In the landmark case of *Runyon v. McCrary*, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), the Supreme Court pushed the meaning of §1981 beyond its obvious language. The statute states only that "all persons . . . shall have the same *right* . . . to make and enforce contracts as is enjoyed by white citizens." (Emphasis added). However, the Supreme Court held that in cases involving discrimination, persons should have a right not otherwise accorded to white citizens, the right to make a contract with an unwilling opposing party. This decision added a panoply of new remedies, including jury trial and damages, as well as a new range of targets, such as private schools, to the nation's basic anti-discrimination laws.

The law at this point was relatively clear. In *Patterson v. McLean Credit Union*, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989), however, the Supreme Court, while retaining the basic interpretation of "right" as meaning "privilege," revisited the term "make contracts" and restricted the meaning of that term. *Patterson*, 109 S. Ct. at 2373-75.

Having previously determined that a proper interpretation of §1981 permits a suit for a discriminatory discharge, I find, as others have, that "the difficult question is whether that interpretation can and does survive *Patterson*." *McKnight v. General Motors Corporation*, 908 F.2d 104, 117 (7th Cir. 1990) (Fairchild, J., concurring in part). The language of *Patterson*, to the extent it can be read as pertaining to discharges, is equivocal at best. For example, the Court states that the right to make a contract "extends only to the formation of a contract, but not to problems that arise

later *from the conditions of continuing employment.*" 109 S. Ct. at 2372 (emphasis added). This language seems to imply that if a discharge is not a "problem" arising from a "condition of continuing employment," then it is actionable under §1981. Elsewhere, however, the Court states with apparently greater definitiveness that "§1981 . . . does not apply to conduct which *occurs after the formation of a contract* . . . ." *Id.* at 2369 (emphasis added). But still later, the Court states that "*postformation conduct* does not involve the right to make a contract, but rather implicates the performance of established contract obligations and the *conditions of continuing employment* . . . ." *Id.* at 2373 (emphasis added). This statement suggests that, to the extent that a discharge does more than "implicate[] . . . the conditions of continuing employment," a discharge is not the sort of postformation conduct that the Court found not to "involve the right to make a contract."

Our problem is created by the fact that these two principles point to directly opposite conclusions in the case of firings motivated by allegedly racial discrimination. A literal application of the language on "post-formation conduct" means §1981 does not cover firings. Firings, by definition must follow hirings. However, the Court has indicated that at least one type of conduct that appears to be post-formation, promotion, shall be deemed to relate to the making of a new contract, and thus falls outside this language. *Id.* at 2377.

On the other hand, a literal application of the second stricture would allow suits concerning firing. Mr. Prather does not complain of his conditions of employment. He complains that he has no employment, having been wrongly fired. The majority concedes that a hiring, followed closely by a firing, could be considered the functional equivalent of no hiring at all, thus triggering §1981 coverage. Opinion at 5. It seems to me that a firing at any date raises the same concerns as a failure to hire:

(1) The party has no contract; it was made in the past, but it has now been completely unmade.

(2) There is no relationship to salvage. It has been terminated by the employer.

(3) Title VII may not provide complete relief.

As none of this language seems to remove discharge claims from the protective scope of §1981, the dissent in *Patterson* assumed, without objection by the majority, the statute's continuing application:

> The very same legislative history that supports our interpretation of §1981 in *Runyon* [v. *McCrary*, 427 U.S. 160 (1976)] also demonstrates that the 39th Congress intended, in the employment context, to go beyond protecting the freedmen from refusals to contract for their labor *and from discriminatory decisions to discharge them.*

109 S. Ct. at 2388 (emphasis added).

I find illuminating the Court's consideration of Patterson's claim for failure to promote. The Court held that a racially discriminatory denial of a promotion, in contrast to the harassment of an employee, is actionable under §1981 "where the promotion rises to the level of an opportunity for a new and distinct relation between the employee and the employer." *Id.* at 2377. This holding indicates that the Court believed that *some* post-contract formation activity -- that which strikes at the essence of the contract or affects its very existence -- is actionable under §1981.

I would hold that the entire reason for protecting "the right to make contracts" is because of the benefits of the status of having a contract or job. If §1981 can cover the failure to achieve a "new and distinct relation" within an existing job, it would seem to me to be most illogical to deny that §1981 covers a persons being cast into a "new

and distinct relation" -- that of unemployment -- from an existing job. Certainly that severance is far more drastic in practical terms than the failure to achieve a promotion. It is also more destructive of the existing relationship, the very relationship that is a reason given for not allowing actions based on conditions of employment. *See Patterson*, 109 S. Ct. at 2374-75.

The court today emphasizes that Prather's claim is more properly cognizable under Title VII, and that the *Patterson* Court sought to avoid "[u]nnecessary overlap between Title VII and §1981." *Id.* at 2375 n.4. *Patterson* recognized, however, that "some overlap will remain between the two statutes: specifically, a refusal to enter into an employment contract on the basis of race." *Id.* at 2375. Because I believe that a discriminatory discharge constitutes a constructive refusal to enter into a nondiscriminatory employment contract, I find this to be a case in which overlap between the two remedial statutes is appropriate under *Runyon*.

In explaining why it took the action that it did in *Patterson*, the court emphasized the following factors distinguishing the areas remaining under the "privilege" doctrine of §1981:

(1) they involve the essence of an employment relationship, *Id.* at 2377;

(2) the overlap with Title VII and other remedies is more understandable, *Id.* at 2375; and,

(3) the more meliorative remedies of Title VII would be preferable only where a relationship existed. *Ibid.*

The facts here offer a particularly compelling case for a resort to §1981. Prather filed an EEOC charge, and the Ohio Civil Rights Commission ordered an award of back pay. Prather now seeks a remedy unavailable under Title VII -- the recovery of damages sufficient to compensate him completely for the discrimination he suffered. I

cannot agree with the court that Prather's §1981 claim would allow him to "circumvent" Title VII's procedures, since Title VII does not offer the relief sought.[1]

A very recent Third Circuit case shows the extremely strained construction that can arise from an absolutely fixed gaze on the moment of contract formation. In

Perry v. Command Performance, 913 F.2d 99 (3d. Cir. 1990), a black customer called a hairdressing parlor and made an appointment for service. When she appeared, the available hairdresser made the claim (perhaps novel in American jurisprudence) "I'm from New Hampshire and I don't deal with blacks!" *Id.* at 100. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the ground that this act was clearly "post formation." The Third Circuit reversed and remanded, directing the district court to determine whether the contract was made at the time of the phone call or was only made if service was offered when the customer appeared. *Id.* at 102. The circuit court apparently agreed with the majority in our case that any type of conduct, no matter how discriminatory, is not encompassed by §1981 if it literally occurs after formation.

In my view, this simply emphasizes that the focus should be on whether the contract is actually in existence and being carried out to some degree, in which case quarrels over conditions of employment or conditions of service are not actionable. To say that there is no action for making a contract on the phone and breaking it when the person appears is to undermine completely the court's holding in *Runyon* and its reaffirmation in *Patterson*.

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[1] Although the court cites the statistic that 43% of all Title VII cases involve discharge claims (opinion at 4, n.4) in support of its argument that a claim such as Prather's can be adequately addressed by Title VII, I note that studies have indicated that discriminatory discharge actions have traditionally been one of the most common uses of §1981. See Hicks v. Brown Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 630, 638 (8th Cir. 1990)(citing Eisenberg and Schwab, The Importance of Section 1981, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 596, 599-601 (1988)).

There is further evidence that the Court in *Patterson* did not intend to withdraw discharge suits from §1981's protection. The Court has several times in subsequent cases indicated that it has not decided this question. In *Jett v. Dallas Independent School District*, 109 S. Ct. 2702, 2709 (1989), decided one week after *Patterson*, the Supreme Court assumed *arguendo* that the scope of the "right . . . to make . . . contracts" under §1981 reaches racially motivated discharges. In *Jett*, the employer school district did not contest that the football coach who was relieved of his duties was protected by §1981. The Court therefore "assume[d] . . . , without deciding, that petitioner's rights under §1981 have been violated by his removal and reassignment." *Id.* at 2710. It appears that the Court had a clear opportunity in *Jett* to apply *Patterson* to discharge cases but declined to do so.

Then in *Lytle v. Household Manufacturing, Inc.*, 110 S. Ct. 1331 (1990), the Court reaffirmed that it had not decided the question whether a retaliatory discharge is actionable under §1981. Because the district court had not addressed the question, the Court refused to decide the matter without the benefit of a complete record. Justice O'Connor in concurrence noted that:

> [o]n remand, therefore, the parties will have ample opportunity to present arguments, and the lower courts will have the first opportunity to consider whether either of petitioner's charges relates to the formation or enforcement of a contract, the two types of claims actionable under §1981, *Patterson*, . . . 109 S. Ct., at 2374, or relates only to "postformation conduct unrelated to an employee's right to enforce [his] contract." *Id.*, at . . . 2367.

Id. at 1339.

I do not believe that the Court would have failed to discuss in *Patterson* the implication of that opinion for the substantial body of Supreme Court case law permitting discharge suits under §1981 if *Patterson* was intended to

have any such implication. I also find it significant that neither *Jett* nor *Lytle* makes the same assumptions about *Patterson*'s effect on discharge claims that the court's opinion does today.

In our situation, the Supreme Court apparently having been deliberately ambiguous, it seems to me that we should interpret *its* ambiguities in a fashion that makes the law a more coherent scheme. Having been precluded from a rigorous interpretation of the language of the statute by the decisions in *Runyon* and *Patterson*, we should give those decisions an interpretation that will provide sensible coverage of "an evil aimed at" rather than a strained construction, not compelled by the statutory language. Our decision today will, in the words of Shakespeare's *Macbeth*, "keep the word of promise to our ear, and break it to our hope."[2]

If Mr. Prather has a right to "make" a contract with an unwilling adversary, that right is substantially vitiated if the adversary can "unmake" the contract without legal liability or opportunity for redress.

As *Patterson* leaves open the question whether a discriminatory discharge violates §1981, I would respect the principle of *stare decisis* and continue to permit, under §1981, suits alleging discriminatory discharges. I therefore would agree with the decision of the Eighth Circuit in *Hicks v. Brown Group, Inc.*, 902 F.2d 630 (8th Cir. 1990) and would reverse and remand for a new trial.

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[2]Macbeth, Act V, Scene vii, lines 50-51.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

SAMUEL I. PRATHER,

Plaintiff Civil Action No.C-3-85-491

-vs- Magistrate Merz

DAYTON POWER & LIGHT CO.

Defendant

DECISION AND ENTRY GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This action for compensatory and punitive damages are related injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C.§1981 is before the Court on Motion of Defendant, The Dayton Power & Light Company, for Summary Judgment (Dcc. #59). Because Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, construed in light of Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. ____, 105 L. Ed. 2d 132, 109 S. Ct. ____ (1989) fails to state a claim for relief which can be granted under §1981, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED.

Procedural History

Plaintiff filed his Complaint herein on March 18, 1985, under 42 U.S.C. §1981 seeking injunctive relief (reinstatement to his job with Defendant) and compensatory and exemplary damages (Doc. #I). Thereafter on February 27, 1986, Judge Richard Dodge of the Montgomery County Common Please Court affirmed the decision of the Ohio Civil Rights Commission finding that DP&L had discharged Mr. Prather in violation of his civil rights. Based on this Common Pleas judgment, Plaintiff moved for summary judgment in this Court as to liability under §1981 (Doc. #II, 3/7/86).

DP&L cross-moved for summary judgment on the basis of the statute of limitations (Doc. #19). Mr. Prather had been discharged on September 13, 1982, and DP&L argued this meant his §1981 claim was barred under Mulligan v. Hazzard, 777F. 2d 340 (6th Cir. 1985), The Magistrate and District Judge Weber agreed (Doc. ##20, 26, 27), but the Sixth

Circuit reversed on the basis of Demery v. Youngstown, 818 F. 2d 1257 (6th Cir. 1987) (Doc. #32).

Upon remand, the Magistrate recommended that Mr. Prather's summary judgment motion on liability be granted, based on the doctrine of res judicata (Doc. #33). Thereafter the parties unanimously consented to magistrate trial jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §636(c) and on March 17, 1989, the Magistrate adopted his prior Report and Recommendations as a decision, with certain modifications (Doc. #52). Immediately prior to that decision, the Magistrate had entered a Scheduling Order for completion of discovery by June 1, 1989, and jury trial on August 14, 1989 (Doc. #51). Pursuant to that Order, Mr. Prather filed an Amended Complaint specifying his damages claims and the parties prepared a proposed joint final pretrial order which was journalized with slight modifications after final pretrial conference on August 4, 1989 (Doc. #56). At the final pretrial conference, DP&L sought

leave to file a motion for summary judgment, a motion Mr. Prather's counsel did not oppose, and DP&L filed the motion sub judice on August 9th, Mr. Prather replying on August 10th.

Findings of Fact

The relevant facts are set forth in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of the Ohio Civil Rights Commission ("OCRC") filed March 12, 1985 (Attached to Doc. #11). These findings have been affirmed on appeal by the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court and the Ohio Supreme Court, Dayton Power & Light Company vs. Ohio Civil Rights Commission, 33 Ohio St. 3d 73, 514 N.E. 2d 1132 (1987). They are entitled to preclusive effect in this Court. 28 U.S.C. §1783; Kremer vs. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980); Migra vs. Warren City School District Bd. of Educ. 465 U.S. 75 (1984).

Mr. Prather's original Charge Affidavit, filed February 28, 1983, alleged that DP&L terminated him because he is black. The OCRC found that Mr.

Prather was employed by DP&L at its Stuart Generating Station from March 19, 1970, until September 13, 1982. On that date he was discharged for cutting a water hose, discipline which the OCRC found to have been caused by Mr. Prather's race and to be harsher than that imposed on white employees for similar conduct. The OCRC ordered Mr. Prather reinstated with back pay. After remand by the Ohio Supreme Court, Mr. Prather was reinstated and paid $235,667.27 in back pay and benefits (Exhibits A,B, C, and D to Doc. #59). It is conclusively established that Mr. Prather was discharged by DP&L because of his race.

Opinion

This Court had previously held (Doc. #33, p.2) that the elements of a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1981 were identical to those under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq., based on Eleventh Circuit law, Stallworth v. Shuler, 777 F.2d 1431 (1985); and Lincoln v. Board of Regents, 697 F.2d 928 (1983). At the time Mr. Prather moved for summary judgment,

DP&L did not contest this proposition (Doc. #33, p. 2), but it now relies on the Supreme Court opinion in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, supra, as a bar to §1981 liability here.

Ms. Patterson charged McLean Credit Union with racial discrimination under §1981 for racial harassment, failure to promote, and discharge. The District Court held racial harassment was not actionable under §1981, but submitted the discharge and failure to promote issues to the jury, which found for McLean. 105 L. Ed. 2d at 146. No issues relating to the discharge claim was appealed, but the case reached the Supreme Court on certiorari on the harassment and failure to promote questions. On its own motion, the Supreme Court had the case reargued on the continued soundness of Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), the decision which had firmly established the liability of private parties to actions under §1981.

In an opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Runyon on stare decisis

grounds, but implicitly rejected decisions such as Stallworth, supra, which made §1981 liability coterminous with Title VII liability. Instead, the majority interpreted §1981 as limited to forbidding discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts.

> The first of these protections extends only to the formation of a contract, but not to problems that may arise later from the conditions of continued employment. ... the right to make contracts does not extend, as a matter of either logic or semantivs, to conduct by the employer after the contract relation has been established, including breach of the terms of the contract or imposition of discriminatory working conditions. Such post-formation conduct does not involve the right to make a contract, but rather implicates the performance of established contracts obligations and the conditions of continuing employment, matters more naturally governed by state contract law and Title VII.

105, L. Ed. 2d at 150-51. Regarding Ms. Patterson's claim of racial harassment, the Supreme Court explicitly held:

> ...racial harassment relating to the conditions of employment is not actionable under §1981 because that provision does not apply to conduct

> which occurs after the formation of a contract and which does not interfere with the right to enforce established contract obligations.

105 L. Ed. 2d at 147.

Mr. Prather attempts to distinguish Patterson on the grounds it was a racial harassment case and he complains of a racially motivated discharge (Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. #61, at pp. 1-2).

Whether Ms. Patterson's §1981 discharge claim should have gone to the jury was not before the Supreme Court; the jury found against her and thus there was no real vehicle to appeal that issue. But to reach its holding, the Supreme Court had to apply the major premise that §1981 does not reach post-formation conduct except conduct which interferes with the right to enforce contracts. That major premise logically extends to racially motivated discharges. Hence this Court holds that DP&L's racially motivated discharge of Mr. Prather is not actionable under §1981.

Plaintiff's counsel present only only one paragraph of argument on whether racially motivated discharges come within Patterson (Doc. #61, pp. 1-2). The bulk of their argument is directed to claiming that Mr. Prather comes within the enumerated rights in §1981 because DP&L interfered with Mr. Prather's right to enforce his contract of employment. They assert:

> At the time of DP&L's racially motivated termination of plaintiff, plaintiff was a member of the recognized labor bargaining unit know as, "Local 175, Utility Workers, AFL-CIO." It is plaintiff's position herein, and the evidence at trial will show, that defendant's conduct during the course of the labor contract arbitration procedure, consisted of offering into evidence, a fiction, or as the state court action determined, a pretext, to mask the improper racial motives behind their acts. This "corruption" on the part of the defendant during the course of the arbitration proceeding amounted to nothing less than an impairment or outright obstruction of plaintiff's right to enforce contractual obligations by nonjudicial methods. The aforesaid action taken by defendant is clearly within the prohibitions enumerated in section 1981.

(Doc. #61, pp. 2-3).

In Patterson the Supreme Court held that the right to enforce contracts free of racial discrimination was one of the rights enumerated in §1981:

> The second of these guarantees, "the same right ... to ... enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens," embraces protection of a legal process, that will address and resolve contract-law claims without regard to race. In this respect, it prohibits discrimination that infects the legal process in ways that prevent one from enforcing contract rights, by reason of his or her race, and this is so whether this discrimination is attributed to a statute or simply to existing practices. It also covers wholly private efforts to impede access to the courts or obstruct nonjudicial methods of adjudicating disputes about the force of binding obligations...

105 L. Ed. 2d at 151.

As the Court understands Mr. Prather's claim, he now assets that DP&L violated his §1981 right to enforce his contract of employment by introducing false evidence at the arbitration hearing. The Court assumes that the false evidence adverted to is the evidence that Mr. Prather was discharged for destroying company property. We know this evidence to be "false" because the OCRC

determined it to be pretextual.

What the OCRC actually did was to infer, from all the evidence, that the discharging officials were racially motivated. This inference is "true" and the competing inference (that the discharge was solely the result of discipline applied without regard to race) is "false" because the OCRC is empowered by law to make findings of fact. It is an inference about intent of the DP&L decisionmakers. It is only an inference, albeit a legally conclusive one. There is no evidence nor did the ORCE itself or its hearing examiner suggest that DP&L presented deliberately perjured testimony on the historical facts: Mr. Prather admitted that he had cut the hose and no DP&L employee has admitted that he recommended the discharge because of racial motivation. (There is, however, ample evidence of racially hostile attitudes on the part of some of Mr. Prather's co-workers.)

Plaintiff does not allege that DP&L presented deliberately perjured testimony or that its lawyers or the company officials authorizing them to present this

case in arbitration knew that any of the company's witnesses was lying either about historical facts or his motivation. Allegations of deliberate presentation of perjured testimony in an arbitration proceeding would probably state a claim for relief under §1981, but no such allegations are made here.

This Court holds that the allegations Mr. Prather does make -- that DP&L presented "false" testimony in that it was not believed by the finder of fact -- does not state a claim for relief under §1981. To permit such a claim would be to hold an employer liable under §1981 every time it contested in good faith and lost a breach of contract claim, either in arbitration or in court. Surely an employer does not interfere with an employee's right to enforce contracts free of racial discrimination when it presents a defense in good faith to a breach of contract claim in court or arbitration. The Supreme Court's explication in Patterson of the second right guaranteed by §1981 does not imply that an employer defends a racial breach of contract case at

its peril. While a good faith defense in such a case does "impede" the employee's enforcement of his or her contract rights, it is an impeding contemplated by our adversary system. The Congress which enacted §1981 surely did not intend to preclude good faith defenses to contract actions brought by black people.

Alternatively, this Court holds that Mr. Prather is procedurally barred from presenting in this action at this time his claim of interference with enforcement of contract rights under §1981.[1]

This case has been litigated for over six years, administratively and in the Ohio and federal courts, as a claim for racially motivated discharge. From the filing of the Charge Affidavit with the OCRC in February, 1983, through filing the Final Pretrial Order

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[1] The Court assumes that Mr. Prather will appeal this Court's ruling that a racially motivated discharge is not actionable under §1981. The alternative procedure ruling commenced in this paragraph on the enforcement of contract issue is included in the event the Court of Appeals disagrees with this Court's substantive ruling on the second issue.

here on August 8, 1989, that has been Plaintiff's sole claim. Putting aside the issue whether he must first present it administratively to the OCRC and EEOC, he has never argued it in this Court until his Memorandum in Opposition to DP&L's motion for summary judgment. Both the Complaint and the Amended Complaint speak only of the discharge issue. That was the sole claim on which the Court rendered partial summary judgment as to liability and as late as the Final Pretrial Order Plaintiff contended all the liability issues has been decided. Plaintiff contends he can prove the new claim at trial (Doc. #61), but the Final Pretrial Order contains no such claim and it "controls the subsequent course of the action." McDowall v. Orr Felt & Blanket Co., 146 F. 2d 136 (6th Clr. 1944). Even if the Court were to permit an amendment of the pleadings to assert this claim, it would be fundamentally unfair to require Defendant to litigate the claim with no more notice that it has had.

The Court is not prepared to conclude that

Plaintiff can never plead and prove a set of facts which would entitle him to relief on his claim of interference with his §1981 right to enforce contracts free of racial discrimination. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). As to any such claim, the Amended Complaint will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Since this Court interprets Patterson v. McLean Credit Union as permanently barring any claim for the racially motivated discharge, that claim will be dismissed with prejudice.

Defendant filed its motion for summary judgment herein four days before trial, at a time when the Court could not call of the jury panel without continuing the trial in the event the motion was not granted. Accordingly, the Clerk shall assess against Defendant the costs of summoning the jury panel for the trial of this case.

August 14, 1989.

MICHAEL R. MERZ
U. S. MAGISTRATE

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

SAMUEL I. PRATHER,

Plaintiff Civil Action No.C-3-85-491

-vs- Magistrate Merz

DAYTON POWER & LIGHT CO.

Defendant

DECISION AND ORDER DENYING
MOTION TO AMEND

This case is before the Court upon Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (second branch of Doc. #72).

Plaintiff Samuel Prather was terminated by Defendant Dayton Power & Light Co. ("DP&L") on September 13, 1982, for intentionally cutting a hose at work. Alleging the termination was racially motivated, he pursued a grievance under the collection bargaining agreement which reached the arbitration hearing stage on June 7, 1983 (See

Transcript of Arbitration Hearing, Doc. #76); a unanimous unfavorable decision was rendered by the arbitration panel on August 18, 1983 (Exhibit C to Doc. #75).

Mr. Prather also filed a complaint of racial discrimination in the discharge with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission which resulted in a favorable finding ultimately affirmed by the Ohio Supreme Court. Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Ohio Civil Rights Commission, 33 Ohio St. 3d 73, 514 N.E. 2d 1132 (1987). Upon remand, Mr. Prather was granted reinstatement and back pay and benefits in the amount of $235,667.27 (Exhibits A-D to Doc. #59).

Giving the Ohio judgment res judicata effect, this Court granted Mr. Prather's motion for summary judgment on liability (Doc. #52, March 17, 1989) and set a damages trial for August 14, 1989. However, just prior to trial, DP&L moved for summary judgment on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. ___, 105 L. Ed. 2d 132, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989). Reading

Patterson as barring §1981 actions for discharge, the Court granted DP&L's summary judgment motion (Doc. #68) and has denied (Doc. #78) Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Judgment which advanced various arguments why Patterson should not be applied.

In Patterson the Supreme Court read 42 U.S.C. §1981 as limited to forbidding racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts. As to this second right, the Supreme Court found that it reaches "discrimination that infects the legal process in ways that prevent one from enforcing contract rights" and "covers wholly private efforts to impede access to the courts or obstruct nonjudicial methods of adjudicating disputes about the force of binding obligations." 105 L. Ed. 2d at 151.

The Complaint in this case was filed March 18, 1985. From that date until filing the motion to amend, and indeed in the prior grievance and Ohio Civil Rights proceedings, Plaintiff pursued one and only claim for relief; that he had been terminated because

of his race. That claim was cognizable in this Court under 42 U.S.C. §1981 until Patterson, but is no longer viable. Plaintiff now seeks to resurrect his §1981 claim by asserting, for the first time, that DP&L interfered with his right to enforce his collective bargaining agreement by threatening and intimidating potential witnesses in the arbitration process. (See proposed Second Amended Complaint, attached to Doc. #72).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) requires a party in Plaintiff's position to obtain leave of court to amend and provides "leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." The factors to be considered in determining such a motion was specified by the Supreme Court in Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 9 L. Ed. 2d 222, 83 S. Ct. 227 (1962):

> If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits. In the absence of any apparent or declared reason – such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive

> on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc. -- the leave sought should, as the rules require, be "freely given."

Id. at 182.

Mr. Prather's new claim appears to state a claim for relief under §1981 as interpreted in Patterson. DP&L has made no objection on this basis, and it appears to the Court that a racially based interference with arbitration proceedings comes within §1981.

However, stating a claim for relief is not adequate under Foman. This Court finds that Mr. Prather has delayed unduly in presenting this new claim and that allowing it at this point would unduly prejudice DP&L and the motion to amend will accordingly be denied.

Mr. Prather's reasons for waiting over four years to asset this claim are completely unexplained. The allegation is that DP&L prevented certain

unnamed potential witnesses from testifying in his favor at the arbitration proceeding by intimidating them. Several such persons have supplied affidavits in support of the motion. As DP&L points out, these are all persons about whom Plaintiff has known for some time: they are co-workers at the Stuart Station who were listed as trial witnesses in this case. There is no indication in any of Plaintiff's motion papers that Plaintiff recently learned of any such threats. Plaintiff's union Steward, James Work, who represented him in the grievance process, does not indicate any witnesses refused to testify for fear of retaliation. Totally absent is any comment by the union attorney, Bruce Pence, who represented Mr. Prather at the arbitration proceeding. While leave to amend to add new claims found in the course of discovery is quite common, there is no indication when Mr. Prather learned of this claim or that he did not know of it well before the original complaint was filed. In the absence of any explanation for the delay, denial of leave to amend is within the Court's

discretion. Freeman v. Continental Gin Co., 381 F. 2d 459 (5th Cir. 1967); Isaac v. Harvard University, 769 F. 2d 817 (1st Cir. 1985).

Of course, a motion to amend is not the place to litigate the merits of the proposed amended complaint. However, when evidence is offered in support of a motion to amend, as Plaintiff has done here, the Court may properly consider the strength of that evidence in determining whether justice requires that the amendment be allowed. In that vein, the Court observes that the tendered affidavits are quite thin. None of the witnesses testifies in the affidavits offered in support of the motion that he was personally threatened by anyone. Danny Doyle says he feared retaliation, but mentions no particular threats at the arbitration stage, although he says he was told that a management person was unhappy with his involvement at the OCRC level (Doyle admitted cutting a hose himself, for which he was also fired.) He also says a number of supervisors (unnamed) indicated to him by their demeanor

(undescribed) and remarks (not quoted) that they didn't want him to help Prather. James Work, Mr. Prather's union steward who represented him in the grievance proceeding, says that Mr. Ralston indicated to him any employee who admitted intentional destruction of company property would be disciplined. Randall Moore says in conclusory fashion that his fellow employees are afraid to testify for fear of retaliation. Danny Dudley also recites no threats, but says supervisory personnel refused to discuss Prather's case with him.

Five of Plaintiff's co-employees did testify at the arbitration proceeding, specifically on the issues of racial attitudes by management personnel. None of Plaintiff's affidavits assert that any retaliation has been taken against any of these employees.

The Court also finds that permitting the amendment would unduly prejudice DP&L. As noted in its motion papers, the Defendant has litigated this case in a number of different fora since 1982. It has deposed the Plaintiff twice without any mention of

any alleged obstruction of the arbitration process. The Court would now be required to reopen discovery; indeed, discovery would essentially have to start over.

Finally, in determining what justice requires in this case, the Court is not unmindful that Plaintiff has already obtained reinstatement to his job and a judgment in excess of a quarter of a million dollars, which has been paid. What Plaintiff now seeks is an opportunity to re-litigate the fairness of a preliminary state of this litigation. Although he had an available remedy to set aside the arbitration award if it was unfairly arrived at, he never pursued that remedy. In effect, the arbitration award has been rendered moot by the OCRC award and its subsequent enforcement by the Ohio courts.

The Motion for Leave to Amend is DENIED.

In the Court's opinion, this case is now final for purposes of appeal.

October 28, 1989.

MICHAEL R. MERZ
U. S. MAGISTRATE

FILED

DEC 28 1990

LEONARD GREEN, C

NO. 89-3999

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

SAMUEL I. PRATHER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

ORDER

v.

DAYTON POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellee

BEFORE: KENNEDY and BOGGS, Circuit Judges; and TIMBERS*, United States Circuit Judge.

The Court having received a petition for rehearing en banc, and the petition having been circulated not only to the original panel members but also to all other active judges of this court, and no judge of this court having requested a vote on the suggestion for rehearing en banc, the petition for rehearing has been referred to the original hearing panel.

The panel has further reviewed the petition for rehearing and concludes that the issues raised in the petition were fully considered upon the original submission and decision of the case. Accordingly, the petition is denied.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

Leonard Green, Clerk

* Hon. William H. Timbers sitting by designation from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

§ 1981. Equal rights under the law

All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as it enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
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OFFICE OF THE CLERK

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NO. 90-1502

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

SAMUEL I. PRATHER,

Petitioner,

vs.

THE DAYTON POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,

Respondent.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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I. QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Was summary judgment against petitioner's complaint for damages for discriminatory discharge under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 properly issued based upon *Patterson* v. *McLean Credit Union*, 491 U.S. ____, 105 L.Ed. 2d 132, 109 S.Ct. 2363 (1989), as applied retroactively?

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying petitioner's motion to amend his complaint when such amendment would inject an entirely new issue on which no discovery had been conducted some six years after the event at issue?

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NO. 90-1502

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

SAMUEL I. FRATHER,

Petitioner,

vs.

THE DAYTON POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,

Respondent.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The history of this case begins on September 13, 1982, when petitioner was discharged for cutting a hose at Dayton Power and Light. He pursued a grievance through arbitration, pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, which resulted in an arbitration hearing on June 7, 1983. Petitioner lost at arbitration. An unfavorable decision was rendered by the arbitration panel on August 18, 1983.

On February 28, 1983, petitioner filed a charge with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission (OCRC), where he ultimately prevailed. As a result of successfully asserting his charge of discrimination, petitioner was awarded reinstatement and paid back pay and benefits in the amount of $235,667.27. This important fact was omitted by petitioner in his Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

Petitioner filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging discriminatory discharge. He amended his complaint on March 27, 1989, and still alleged only discriminatory discharge. In neither complaint did petitioner allege the underlying 1983 arbitration was tainted.

Although summary judgment was granted by the trial court as to the fact petitioner was improperly discharged, significant issues remained regarding whether he was entitled to any other compensatory damages since he was reinstated and paid $235,667.27, and whether he could prove that respondent's conduct entitled him to punitive damages. Respondent sought summary judgment as to these remaining issues based upon the recent Supreme Court decision of *Patterson* v. *McLean Credit Union*, 491 U.S. ____, 105 L.Ed. 2d 132, 109 S.Ct. 2363 (1989). After briefing, the court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment.

Thereafter, petitioner sought to alter or amend that decision and also sought to file a second amended complaint, alleging for the first time the 1983 arbitration was tainted. After briefing, the trial court overruled both motions. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court on November 14, 1990, and denied the petition for rehearing on December 28, 1990.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On September 13, 1982, petitioner, Samuel Prather, was terminated for intentionally cutting a hose while at work at the Dayton Power & Light Company (DP&L). Mr. Prather knew that DP&L had a policy of discharging employees who were caught destroying property. He admitted that he lied to not only DP&L employees about cutting the hose, but also initially lied to the Ohio Civil Rights Commission about the fact he cut the hose.

Petitioner contended that DP&L terminated him not for cutting the hose, which he now admits he did, but because he was black. Although petitioner focuses upon comments made by two supervisors, Mr. Hackathorn and Mr. Mason, for this position, petitioner admitted that even though these men may have made discriminatory comments to him, they did not treat him any differently than white employees. He also admitted that he never filed any grievances or complaints with his union or the company about any alleged racial discrimination from the time he was hired in 1970 to when he was discharged in 1982.

After summary judgment was granted against petitioner, he asserted for the first time that DP&L retaliated in some manner against employees who testified at the arbitration hearing held in 1983. However, the facts establish that petitioner called as witnesses fellow employees John Feurt, Eddie Grooms, Lester Johnson, and Frank Rosselot. All of these employees testified that the company employees involved in petitioner's discharge were prejudiced. These same employees testified in the same manner before the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, and were named as witnesses again by petitioner in this action. The only witness known to have lied during any of these proceedings was petitioner himself.

Petitioner contended that retaliation was taken against Danny Doyle for testifying. However, the facts established that the company policy was to discharge employees who were caught destroying property and petitioner admitted the

first time DP&L knew Danny Doyle cut a hose was shortly before petitioner's arbitration. He further admitted that once it was known Doyle cut a hose, he was discharged, which was consistent with the company policy.

After petitioner and his witnesses testified at the arbitration, he was discharged for cutting the hose, as he eventually admitted he did. After receiving an adverse finding against him at the arbitration, he did not appeal that decision or claim that the arbitration process was tainted. Rather petitioner proceeded to the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, which resulted in an order that petitioner be reinstated with back pay. After appeal, petitioner was reinstated to his position at DP&L and paid $235,667.27 in back pay and benefits.

During the same period of time, petitioner filed suit in federal court alleging his discharge violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981. He amended the complaint on March 24, 1989, four years after filing the initial complaint. A review of the complaint and amended complaint establishes no allegations were made about alleged improprieties during the 1983 arbitration. Petitioner's deposition was also taken twice, on August 23, 1985, and March 17, 1988, during which petitioner made no mention of any such improprieties. Although petitioner submitted affidavits of various employees in support of his new allegation that the arbitration was impermissibly tainted, the affidavits were important for what was not stated. None of the employees who testified for petitioner asserted any retaliation was taken against them. Danny Doyle alleged he feared retaliation, but made no mention of threats or any specific facts to support action taken by DP&L. Petitioner's union steward, James Work, who represented petitioner in the grievance process, did not indicate any witness refused to testify for fear of retaliation. Moreover, no excuse was proffered by petitioner to justify delay of over six years before raising this claim of a tainted arbitration.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST PETITIONER'S COMPLAINT UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1981 FOR COMPENSATORY AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES RESULTING FROM A DISCRIMINATORY DISCHARGE WAS PROPERLY ISSUED BASED UPON *PATTERSON* v. *McLEAN CREDIT UNION*, 491 U.S. ____, 105 L.Ed. 2d 132, 109 S.Ct. 2363 (1989), AS APPLIED RETROACTIVELY, PARTICULARLY SINCE PETITIONER PREVAILED IN STATE COURT, WHERE HE WAS AWARDED $235,667.27 IN DAMAGES AND WAS REINSTATED.

Petitioner asserts that a writ of certiorari should be granted because there is a conflict between the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals as to whether *Patterson* v. *McLean Credit Union*, 491 U.S. ____, 105 L.Ed. 2d 132, 109 S.Ct. 2363 (1989) applies to discriminatory discharge actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981. However, the case upon which petitioner relies for the conflict, *Hicks* v. *Brown Group, Inc.*, 902 F.2d 630 (8th Cir. 1990), *vacated*, ____ U.S. ____, 59 U.S.L.W. 3635, 55 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P40,604 (1991) was vacated by the Supreme Court and remanded to the Eighth Circuit for further consideration in light of the Eighth Circuit's *en banc* rehearing in *Taggert* v. *Jefferson County Child Support Enforcement Unit*, 915 F.2d 396 (8th Cir. 1990) *rehearing en banc* (Feb. 1, 1991). The panel in *Taggert*, *supra*, disapproved of the *Hicks*, *supra*, decision. It is likely the Eighth Circuit will join with the majority of jurisdictions that have found *Patterson*, *supra*, to preclude discriminatory discharge actions under § 1981. Although, in all probability, no conflict in the law exists, respondent will address why the Sixth Circuit decision in this case was correct.

In *Patterson* v. *McLean Credit Union*, 491 U.S. ____, 105 L.Ed. 2d 132, 109 S.Ct. 2363 (1989), the United States

Supreme Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 did not apply to conduct occurring after the formation of the contract and conduct that does not interfere with the right to enforce established contract obligations. The Supreme Court in *Patterson* had granted certiorari on whether a harassment and failure to promote claim were cognizable based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The majority of the court interpreted § 1981 as limited to forbidding discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts:

> The first of these protections extends only to the formation of a contract, *but not to problems that may arise later* from the conditions of continued employment. . . . *the right to make contracts does not extend, as a matter of either logic or semantics, to conduct by the employer after the contract relation has been established, including breach of the terms of the contract or imposition of discriminatory working conditions.* Such post-formation conduct does not involve the right to make a contract, but rather implicates the performance of established contract obligations and the conditions of continuing employment, *matters more naturally governed by state contract law and Title VII.*

105 L.Ed. 2d at 150-51. (Emphasis supplied.)

Since *Patterson* was not a discharge case, petitioner contends that its limitation of § 1981 actions is not applicable to discharge cases. This contention has no merit. First, the obvious intent of the Supreme Court was to limit § 1981 claims so as not to include post-contract formation claims: "Section 1981 cannot be construed as a general proscription of racial discrimination in all aspects of contract relations, for it expressly prohibits discrimination only in the making and enforcement of contracts." *Id.* at 150. Thus, under *Patterson*, once a party has secured employment, the protection afforded by § 1981 to make a contract, is at an end. The breach of that contract is only actionable at state law or under Title VII, 42

U.S.C. § 2000 *et seq. Id.* at 150-151. The *Patterson* court condemned any interpretation that overlapping remedies be available under Title VII and § 1981 stating "[u]nnecessary overlap between Title VII and § 1981 would also serve to upset the delicate balance between employee and employer rights struck by Title VII." *Id.* at 154, n. 4. It is clear from a reading of *Patterson* that § 1981 cannot be used as a vehicle to redress a discriminatory discharge claim.

The majority of other jurisdictions confronted with the question of whether discriminatory discharge is actionable under § 1981 after *Patterson*, have held that discriminatory discharges are not actionable under § 1981. *See e.g.*, *Overby* v. *Chevron USA, Inc.*, 884 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1989) (retaliatory discharge), *Greggs* v. *Hillman Distrib. Co.*, 719 F.Supp. 592 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (discriminatory discharge); *Mathis* v. *Boeing Military Airplane Co.*, 719 F.Supp. 991 (D. Kan. 1989) (retaliatory discharge); *Rivera* v. *AT&T Info. Systems, Inc.*, 719 F.Supp. 962 (D. Colo. 1989) (discriminatory discharge), *Brackshaw* v. *Miles, Inc.*, 723 F.Supp. 60 (E.D. Ill. 1989) (forced resignation).

Petitioner attempts to avoid the application of the *Patterson* rules to this discharge case by asserting that had the Supreme Court intended to apply *Patterson* to discharge cases, it would have done so in *Jett* v. *Dallas Independent School Dist.*, 491 U.S. ____, 105 L.Ed. 2d 598, 109 S.Ct. 2702 (1989). However, in addition to the clear warning in *Patterson* that no "unnecessary overlap" should occur between § 1981 claims and Title VII claims, the Supreme Court in *Jett* did not have before it the issue whether to apply § 1981 to post-contract formation conduct since it was not raised or discussed in the lower courts.

Petitioner also seeks to avoid application of *Patterson* to this case by contending *Patterson* should constitute an exception to the general rule that new judge-made law be given retroactive effect. *See Robinson* v. *Neal*, 409 U.S. 505, 35 L.Ed.2d 29, 93 S.Ct. 876 (1973). In order to establish an exception to

this rule, the criteria set forth in *Chevron Oil Co.* v. *Huson*, 404 U.S. 97, 30 L.Ed.2d 296, 92 S.Ct. 349 (1971) must be used. The criteria as articulated in *Huson*, are as follows:

> First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied . . . or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed . . . . Second, . . . we must * * * weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation. ". . . Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for [w]here a decision of this court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our bases for avoiding the 'injustice or hardship' by a holding or nonretroactivity."

404 U.S. 106-07 (citations omitted).

In this case, the *Patterson* rule does create a new principle of law, because prior to *Patterson*, § 1981 was generally considered coextensive with Title VII, which allowed redress for discriminatory discharge. *See generally*, *Stallworth* v. *Shuler*, 777 F.2d 1431 (11th Cir. 1985) (§ 1981 is as broad as Title VII). In *Patterson*, the Supreme Court decided that § 1981 should not be as extensive as Title VII and urged that construction of § 1981 occur so as to avoid such overlap.

Although *Patterson* created new law, it nonetheless must be given retroactive effect because doing so would further the purpose of *Patterson* without producing substantial inequitable results. The purpose of *Patterson* was to restrict § 1981 claims to claims the Supreme Court has determined carry out the congressional intent and in a way that will not conflict with Title VII. Thus, the second *Chevron* factor clearly favors retroactive application of *Patterson*.

In turning to the third *Chevron* factor, it is clear that substantial inequities will not occur in this case if *Patterson* is applied retroactively. As stated previously, petitioner has already been awarded reinstatement and paid back pay and benefits in the amount of $235,667.27. Thus, no substantial inequity will result to petitioner since he has already received that to which he was entitled under the only proper claim, Title VII.

The majority of courts considering the question of whether *Patterson* should be applied retroactively have concluded it should. *See, e.g., Morgan* v. *Kansas City Area Trans. Authority*, 720 F.Supp. 758 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (citing cases), *Williams* v. *National Railroad Passenger Corp.*, 716 F.Supp. 49 (D.C. Col. 1989); *Brackshaw* v. *Miles, Inc.*, 723 F. Supp. 60 (E.D. Ill. 1989). In fact, in a very recent Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case, the Fifth Circuit applied *Patterson* retroactively even after a jury verdict had been awarded, and vacated the portion of damages attributable to the § 1981 action. *Carroll* v. *General Accident Ins. Co.*, 891 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1990).

Although petitioner cites to the case of *Gillespie* v. *First Interstate Bank*, 717 F.Supp. 649 (E.D. Wisc. 1989) for the proposition *Patterson* should not be applied retroactively, that decision is clearly in the minority and is also not applicable herein. In *Gillespie*, a verdict had been rendered for appellant. No such situation exists herein. Petitioner bore the burden of proof that he was entitled to compensatory damages above the $235,667.27 in back pay and benefits already paid and also bore the burden of proof that the requisite intent necessary to obtain punitive damages. Moreover, as evident by the Fifth Circuit case of *Carroll*, *supra*, even where a verdict is rendered, *Patterson* can still apply retroactively. To do otherwise would thwart the purpose of § 1981 as enunciated by the Supreme Court in *Patterson*.

II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT TO CHALLENGE THE ARBITRATION WHEN SUCH AMENDMENT WOULD INJECT AN ENTIRELY NEW ISSUE ON WHICH NO DISCOVERY HAD BEEN CONDUCTED SOME SIX YEARS AFTER THE ARBITRATION, ESPECIALLY SINCE HE PREVAILED IN STATE COURT.

After the trial court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment, petitioner moved to file a third amended complaint. He sought in this proposed amended complaint to allege for the first time that the 1983 arbitration was tainted, in violation of his contract rights as now defined in *Patterson*. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling petitioner's untimely motion.

The first complaint in this case was filed on March 18, 1985. Later, on March 27, 1989, petitioner filed an amended complaint. The only allegation in either complaint was his claim he was discriminatorily discharged. The complaints were absolutely void of any reference to the underlying arbitration. After almost five years of litigation, and through two depositions of petitioner, he raised for the first time in the proposed amended complaint an allegation that the 1983 arbitration held pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement was tainted and constituted a violation of his right to contract.

In determining whether leave to amend should be granted, the factors set forth in *Forman* v. *Davis*, 371 U.S. 178, 9 L.Ed. 2d 222, 83 S.Ct. 227 (1962), must be considered:

> If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits. In the absence of any apparent or declared reason — such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory

> motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc. — the leave sought should, as the rules require, be "freely given."

Analysis of petitioner's new claim in light of the *Forman* factors leads to the conclusion leave to amend was properly denied. As the trial court found, petitioner unduly delayed presenting this new claim and allowing it would unduly prejudice respondent. This finding should not be disturbed absent a showing the trial court abused its discretion.

At no time did petitioner offer any explanation for his delay of almost five years from the date of suit and almost six years from the date of the arbitration for his delay. The witnesses he now claims were somehow, albeit unspecified, threatened, were all witnesses known to him at the time of the arbitration, and, in fact, testified for him at that time and before the OCRC. Neither petitioner's union steward nor his union attorney attest to any knowledge of any retaliatory threats by respondent. The absence of an explanation for this delay is grounds in and of itself to deny the motion for leave to amend. *Freeman* v. *Continental Gas Co.*, 381 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1967); *Isaac* v. *Harvard University*, 769 F.2d 817 (1st Cir. 1985).

Moreover, the trial court's review of the proffered affidavits in support of petitioner's motion should also be undisturbed as it found the affidavits to be "quite thin." The allegations were unspecific, general conclusions without any factual support. In fact, the record before the trial court established that five of petitioner's coworkers did testify in his favor at both the arbitration and the OCRC hearing, and no affidavit stated any retaliation against these employees occurred.

Prejudice to respondent would be great. Since the arbitra-

tion process was never an issue in this case, respondent did no discovery as to what occurred at the arbitration. It never had reason to depose the employees involved, the arbitrators, including the independent chairman, the attorneys involved, or the union steward. With over six years having passed by since 1983 arbitration, it is extremely unlikely independent recollections exist.

Other considerations also are against petitioner's motion for leave to amend the complaint. He failed to appeal the arbitration finding against him. However, he did ultimately prevail in the Ohio courts, and obtained reinstatement and back pay, which rendered the arbitration moot. He also failed to assert this claim the last time he amended his complaint in March of 1989.

Moreover, the proposed amendment to add the claim the arbitration was tainted is barred by the statute of limitations. The adverse arbitration decision was issued on August 18, 1983. Under the one year statute of limitations, the action is time barred. *Mulligan* v. *Hazard*, 777 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1985), *cert. denied*, 106 S.Ct. 2902 (1986). If the longer six year statute is applied, the statute ran five days before petitioner moved to amend his complaint.

While petitioner may claim the new allegation should relate back, this contention should be rejected. The question as to whether the arbitration process was impermissibly tainted arose not from petitioner's discharge, but rather from the collective bargaining contract. It involves determining whether the company *and* the union complied with the contract provisions governing arbitration. This question stands independent from whether petitioner was discharged for racial reasons.

Since the issue of the adequacy of the arbitration process was never raised in the case, no discovery was ever conducted on this new claim. In the years that have passed by, respondent never interviewed or deposed any of those involved in the arbitration, such as the chairman, because there was no

complaint about the arbitration process. This lack of identity between the original complaints and the proffered amendment and the lack of any notice precludes the relation back of the second amended complaint. *See U.S.* v. *Templeton*, 199 F.Supp. 179 (D.C. Tenn. 1961). Lack of notice alone can defeat a demand that a claim relate back. *Minnesota Chippewa Tribe* v. *U.S.*, 768 F.2d 338 (C.A. Fed. 1985); *SEC* v. *Seaboard Corp.*, 677 F.2d 1301, 1314 (9th Cir. 1982). This rule promotes the objective of a statute of limitations, which is to protect persons from the necessity of defending stale claims. *Hockett* v. *American Airlines, Inc.*, 357 F.Supp. 1343 (D.C. Ill. 1973).

In addition to these substantive and procedural barriers to petitioner's proposed amendment, petitioner also ignores the realities of his case. While he asserts his § 1981 claim should survive because DP&L impaired his ability to enforce through legal process his contract rights, he ignores the fact that through the very legal processes he employed he prevailed.

In *Patterson* v. *McLean Credit Union*, 491 U.S. ____, 105 L.Ed. 2d 132, 151 (June 15, 1989), the Supreme Court discussed the right to enforce contracts guarantee embodied in § 1981. The court stated that this guarantee "embraces protection of a legal process, and of a right to access to legal process, that will address and resolve contract law claims without regard to race." *Id.* In this case, petitioner had the same access to the legal process as enjoyed by white citizens. He had a hearing before the OCRC, where he prevailed, and had a hearing before the Ohio Supreme Court, which reinstated the hearing officer's decision. To accept petitioner's argument that his enforcement rights were impaired because he lost the arbitration ignores the judicial process he successfully employed and would create expanded liability on employers. Employers would become subject to § 1981 suits if they participated and won in an arbitration process, even when the ultimate result was against the employer. The legal process contemplated by the court in *Patterson* was not interim, ultimately nonbinding processes, but controlling, binding legal processes.

CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons set forth above, The Dayton Power & Light Company asks that Mr. Prather's petition be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

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APPENDIX

§ 2000e-5. Enforcement provisions

(a) Power of Commission to prevent unlawful employment practices. The Commission is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from engaging in any unlawful employment practice as set forth in section 703 or 704 of this title [42 USCS §§ 2000e-2 or 2000e-3].

(b) Charges by persons aggrieved or member of Commission of unlawful employment practices by employers, etc.; filing; allegations; notice to respondent; contents of notice; investigation by Commission; contents of charges; prohibition on disclosure of charges; determination of reasonable cause; conference, conciliation, and persuasion for elimination of unlawful practices; prohibition on disclosure of informal endeavors to end unlawful practices; use of evidence in subsequent proceedings; penalties for disclosure of information; time for determination of reasonable cause. Whenever a charge is filed by or on behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved, or by a member of the Commission, alleging that an employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, has engaged in an unlawful employment practice, the Commission shall serve a notice of the charge (including the date, place and circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice) on such employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee (hereinafter referred to as the "respondent") within ten days, and shall make an investigation thereof. Charges shall be in writing under oath or affirmation and shall contain such information and be in such form as the Commission requires. Charges shall not be made public by the Commisison. If the Commission determines after such investigation that there is

not reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, it shall dismiss the charge and promptly notify the person claiming to be aggrieved and the respondent of its action. In determining whether reasonable cause exists, the Commission shall accord substantial weight to final findings and orders made by State or local authorities in proceedings commenced under State or local law pursuant to the requirements of subsections (c) and (d). If the Commission determines after such investigation that there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. Nothing said or done during and as a part of such informal endeavors may be made public by the Commission, its officers or employees, or used as evidence in a subsequent proceeding without the written consent of the persons concerned. Any person who makes public informaiton in violation of this subsection shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both. The Commission shall make its determination on reasonable cause as promptly as possible and, so far as practicable, not later than one hundred and twenty days from the filing of the charge or, where applicable under subsection (c) or (d), from the date upon which the Commission is authorized to take action with respect to the charge.

(c) State or local enforcement proceedings; notification of State or local authority; time for filing charges with Commission; commencement of proceedings. In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a State, or political subdivision of a State, which has a State or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, no charge may be filed under subsection (a) [(b)] by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated, pro-

vided that such sixty-day period shall be extended to one hundred and twenty days during the first year after the effective date of such State or local law. If any requirement for the commencement of such proceedings is imposed by a State or local authority other than a requirement of the filing of a written and signed statement of the facts upon which the proceeding is based, the proceeding shall be deemed to have been commenced for the purposes of this subsection at the time such statement is sent by registered mail to the appropriate State or local authority.

(d) State or local enforcement proceedings; notification of State or local authority; time for action on charges by Commission. In the case of any charge filed by a member of the Commission alleging an unlawful employment practice occurring in a State or political subdivision of a State which has a State or local law prohibiting the practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, the Commission shall, before taking any action with respect to such charge, notify the appropriate State or local officals and, upon request, afford them a reasonable time, but not less than sixty days (provided that such sixty-day period shall be extended to one hundred and twenty days during the first year after the effective day of such State of local law), unless a shorter period is requested, to act under such State or local law to remedy the practice alleged.

(e) Time for filing charges; time for service of notice of charge on respondent; filing of charge by Commission with State or local agency. A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred and notice of the charge (including the date, place and circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice) shall be served upon the person against whom such charge is made within ten days thereafter, except that in a case of an unlawful employment

practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, such charge shall be filed by or on behalf of the person aggrieved within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or within thirty days after receiving notice that the State or local agency has terminated the proceedings under the State or local law, whichever is earlier, and a copy of such charge shall be filed by the Commission with the State or local agency.

(f) Civil action by Commission, Attorney General, or person aggrieved; preconditions; procedure; appointment of attorney; payment of fees, costs, or security; intervention; stay of Federal proceedings; action for appropriate temporary or preliminary relief pending final disposition of charge; jurisdiction and venue of United States courts; designation of judge to hear and determine case; assignment of case for hearing; expedition of case; appointment of master.

(1) If within thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission or within thirty days after expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c) or (d), the Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission, the Commission may bring a civil action against any respondent not a government, government agency, or political subdivision named in the charge. In the case of a respondent which is a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision, if the Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission the Commission shall take no further action and shall refer the case to the Attorney General who may bring a civil action against such respondent in the appropriate United States district court. The person or persons aggrieved shall have the right to intervene in a civil action brought by the Commission or the Attorney General in a case involving a government, governmental agency, or

political subdivision. If a charge filed with the Commission pursuant to subsection (b) is dismissed by the Commission, or if within one hundred and eighty days from the filing of such charge or the expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c) or (d), whichever is later, the Commission has not filed a civil action under this section or the Attorney General has not filed a civil action in a case involving a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision, or the Commission has not entered into a conciliation agreement to which the person aggrieved is a party, the Commission, or the Attorney General in a case involving a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision, shall so notify the person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge (A) by the person claiming to be aggrieved or (B) if such charge was filed by a member of the Commission, by any person whom the charge alleges was aggrieved by the alleged unlawful employment practice. Upon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as the court may deem just, the court may appoint an attorney for such complainant and may authorize the commencement of the action without the payment of fees, costs, or security. Upon timely application, the court may, in its discretion, permit the Commission, or the Attorney General in a case involving a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision, to intervene in such civil action upon certification that the case is of general public importance. Upon request, the court may, in its discretion, stay further proceedings for not more than sixty days pending the termination of State or local proceedings described in subsections (c) or (d) of this section or further efforts of the Commission to obtain voluntary compliance.

(2) Whenever a charge is filed with the Commission and the Commission concludes on the basis of a preliminary investigation, that prompt judicial action is necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act [title], the Commission, or the Attorney General in a case involving a government,

governmental agency, or political subdivision, may bring an action for appropriate temporary or preliminary relief pending a final disposition of such charge. Any temporary restraining order or other order granting preliminary or temporary relief shall be issued in accordance with rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It shall be the duty of a court having jurisdiction over proceedings under this section to assign cases for hearing at the earliest practicable date and to cause such cases to be in every way expedited.

(3) Each United States district court and each United States court of a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this title [42 USCS §§ 2000e et seq.] Such an action may be brought in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, but if the respondent is not found within any such district, such an action may be brought within the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office. For purposes of sections 1404 and 1406 of title 28 of the United States Code, the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office shall in all cases be considered a district in which the action might have been brought.

(4) It shall be the duty of the chief judge of the district (or in his absence, the acting chief judge) in which the case is pending immediately to designate a judge in such district to hear and determine the case. In the event that no judge in the district is available to hear and determine the case, the chief judge of the district, or the acting chief judge, as the case may be, shall certify this fact to the chief judge of the circuit (or in his absence, the acting chief judge) who shall then designate a district or circuit judge of the circuit to hear and determine the case.

(5) It shall be the duty of the judge designated pursuant to this subsection to assign the case for hearing at the earliest practicable date and to cause the case to be in every way expedited. If such judge has not scheduled the case for trial within one hundred and twenty days after issue has been joined, that judge may appoint a master pursuant to rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

(g) **Injunctions; affirmative action; equitable relief; accrual of back pay; reduction of back pay; limitations on judicial orders.** If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. Back pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the Commission. Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable. No order of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement of an individual as a member of a union, or the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was refused admission, suspended, or expelled, or was refused employment or advancement or was suspended or discharged for any reason other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin or in violation of section 704(a) [42 USCS § 2000e-3(a)].

(h) **Provisions of 29 USCS §§ 101 et seq. not applicable to civil actions for prevention of unlawful practices.** The provisions of the Act entitled "An Act to amend the Judicial Code

and to define and limit the jurisdiction of courts sitting in equity, and for other purposes," approved March 23, 1932 (29 U.S.C. 101-115), shall not apply with respect to civil actions brought under this section.

(i) **Proceedings by Commission to compel compliance with judicial orders.** In any case in which an employer, employment agency, or labor organization fails to comply with an order of a court issued in a civil action brought under this section, the Commission may commence proceedings to compel compliance with such order.

(j) **Appeals.** Any civil action brought under this section and any proceedings brought under subsection (i) shall be subject to appeal as provided in sections 1291 and 1292, title 28 United States Code.

(k) **Attorney's fee, liability of Commission and United States for costs.** In any action or proceeding under this title [42 USCS §§ 2000e et seq.] the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.